While all these aforementioned nations developed BW programs they were at the
same time busy talking with other nations about banning BW. Talks over the past
century have resulted in two major international documents concerning BW: The
Geneva Protocol in 1925 (5, 12,
68) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention (BTWC) in 1972 (16, 27, 28). Seven years after the conclusion of WWI
the League of Nations created The Geneva Protocol. It contained the
“Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases, and
of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.” This Protocol was signed originally by
the United States in 1925, but not ratified. It banned the used of BW in warfare
but it did not ban the research, manufacturing, and stockpiling of these
weapons; it also did not cover internal or civil conflicts and did not have
provisions for a verification of compliance. A large number of nations reserved
the right to retaliate in kind if BW should ever be used against them. As a
result this Protocol was called a no-first-use agreement. By 1989, 123 countries
had signed The Geneva Protocol (16, 28,
29).
In April of 1972, 105 countries including the U.S. and the USSR signed
another agreement called, "The Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (biological) and
Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction". This treaty is more commonly known
as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention or BTWC. Parties to this
convention agreed not to develop, produce, stockpile, or acquire biological
agents or toxins "of types and in quantities that have no justification for
prophylactic, protective, and other peaceful purposes," as well as related
weapons and means of delivery. Unfortunately, this convention did not contain
provisions for verifying compliance nor did it prohibit defensive research on
BW. In 1975 the Ford Administration and the U.S. Senate approved both the Geneva
Protocol and the BTWC (16, 23,
28).
Even though BTWC signatories agreed to destroy their BW programs or not begin a BW program official U.S. government statements reported for many years that four nations possessed offensive BW at the time they had signed the BTWC and that the number of nations with offensive BW had increased to 10 nations by 1989 (Iraq, Libya, Syria, Iran, Israel, Egypt, China, North Korea, USSR, China). It is believed that around 12 countries in the world still have biological weapons capabilities (8, 20, 23, 30).
Following dismantling of most of the BW program in the USSR, many individuals associated with the BW program suffered from poor economic conditions and there was concern that they might sell their knowledge to rogue states or nonstate actors. There is little evidence to support this concern. As of 1997 very few BW researchers have emigrated from Russia. Of those that did emigrate around 90 percent went to the U.S., Western Europe or Israel. The small number that did move to other countries went to countries that are of no current BW proliferation concern (8, 20).
An additional concern of the BTWC is that there has yet to be a means to
verify whether nations have a BW program. Creation of a verification protocol to
the BTWC began in 1991 during the third BTWC Review Conference. European
countries wanted a rigorous and intrusive on-site regime. However, the U.S. did
not want such an intrusive regime. They were concerned that such a protocol
could compromise private industries confidential information allowing others to
copy their processes weakening their ability to compete. Due to this
potential problem and several others the U.S. forced a compromise called VEREX
(Verification Experts Exercise; 23).
© 2005 Neal Chamberlain. All rights reserved.
Site Last Revised 6/14/11
Neal Chamberlain, Ph.D. A. T. Still University of Health Sciences/Kirksville
College of Osteopathic Medicine.
Site maintained by: Neal R. Chamberlain Ph.D.: nchamberlain@atsu.edu